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This study focuses on the inﬂuence of heavy job demands on retirement,
using the available SHARE waves. Heavy job demands may have a direct
and health mediated eﬀect on individual retirement. An econometric
challenge is the dynamic self-selection of workers into jobs. The main
ﬁndings indicate: the frequency of heavy job demands is higher among
workers with low levels of socioeconomic status. Heavy job demands are
associated with on average higher retirement probabilities, once workers
become eligible to pension beneﬁts. The eﬀect is driven by long-term
exposure to heavy job demands during the career. There are overall no
retirement eﬀects in the age bracket 50–58 and thus no indication for
strong adverse health eﬀects. A change in the level of current job demands
does not inﬂuence the subsequent probability of retirement.
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1. Introduction
An increase in labor force participation rates of older workers and thus a raise
of average eﬀective retirement age is a declared target of European governments
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2010). Early retirement programs have been
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1ceased and some countries plan to increase or have already increased the normal
retirement age. The eﬀectiveness of these measures will depend on the ability
of workers to delay retirement.
Previous research, particularly in occupational epidemiology, suggest that
certain job attributes contribute to poor health outcomes and therefore lead to
early retirement. Especially, heavy job demands are conjectured to have adverse
health eﬀects. But the eﬀect is compensable by, for example, rewards, task
control, and an individual’s intrinsic ability to cope with stressful situations.
The available empirical ﬁndings are limited and inconclusive. The extant
literature usually supports an association between job demands and early and
even disability retirement. But many of the available studies are silent about
the inﬂuences of dynamic selection of workers into jobs. Selection will bias
the results, if heavy job demands correlate with unobserved but retirement
relevant characteristics of workers, or if workers choose jobs in order to reach
an otherwise determined retirement age.
The aim of this paper is two shed light on the eﬀect of heavy job demands
on the retirement decision. Heavy job demands are deﬁned as a combination
of constant time pressure and physical eﬀorts. I pursue two related questions:
what is the average diﬀerence in retirement probability and would a change
in job demands in the population at risk of retirement alter the subsequent
labor force cessation probability. To address selection bias, I use longitudinal
information of workload on the main job, similar to Chirikos and Nestel (1991);
Hayward et al. (1998), and, additionally, an instrumental variable approach.
The IV strategy is adopted from Friedberg (2003). She investigates the role of
computer use on the timing of retirement. Like heavy job demands, computer
use is an endogenous explanatory variable in the retirement decision because
of selection and unobservable covariates. I follow her strategy and instrument
heavy job demands by occupation-speciﬁc averages of workload levels. The
data set is constructed from the available SHARE waves. SHARE is a large
European survey on characteristics and social situations of persons aged 50 and
above.
The results indicate limited inﬂuences of heavy job demands on retirement.
In the age bracket 50–58, neither past nor current exposure to heavy job
demands have an eﬀect. However, in the age span 59 till normal retirement
age, past exposure is clearly associated with higher retirement probabilities.
2The ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of covariates like health status, pension
entitlement and early retirement opportunities, and to treatment of the current
exposure to heavy job demands as endogenous variable. Thus, it appears that
in contrast to previous ﬁndings the degree of job demands does not lead to very
early labor force cessation, for example, through disability retirement. Instead,
workers with an employment background in demanding jobs have a robustly
higher retirement probability, once they reach the eligible age span for pension
beneﬁts. Conditioned on the employment history, a decrease of workload for
those workers, who were exposed to heavy job demands, has no eﬀect on the
subsequent probability of labor force cessation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the ex-
isting theoretical and empirical literature on the link between job characteristics,
particularly job demands, and the retirement decision. The section furthermore
describes and highlights the possible sources of selection bias. Section 3 derives
the empirical model and discusses the estimation strategies. In section 4 the
dataset for the estimation is introduced, the dependent and independent vari-
ables are described and corresponding descriptive statistics are presented. The
estimations of the eﬀect of heavy job demands on retirement are derived and
discussed in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the main results and conclusions
of the study.
2. Background
2.1. Job demands and labor force participation
Job demands comprise the degree of physical and psychological eﬀorts on a job.
The exposure to high job demands and therefore to high levels of workload can
constitute a stressor and thus an antecedent to stress reactions, like fatigue or
exhaustion. Consequently, job demands may have adverse health eﬀects.
The idea of a link between job demands and stress reactions is formalized in
several models in psychology and occupational epidemiology. A common feature
is the potentially adverse inﬂuence of job demands on health outcomes that is,
however, compensable by an appropriate level of job resources, like decision
latitude, the level of rewards and status control, or resources in general. The
worst working conditions in terms of health hazards are usually characterized by
3an imbalance between the level of demands and the resources to cope with the
demands. Well established models in this ﬁeld are the demand-control model
(Karasek, 1979) and the eﬀort-reward imbalance model (Siegrist, 1996).
The demand-control approach focuses on job demands and the decision
latitude. Decision latitude captures an individual’s ability to control his/ her
work activities, and the skill usage and development. High control provides
learning opportunities, while high demand conditions constitute strains and
thus increase stress as well as learning opportunities. Situations of high demand
in conjunction with low control, called job strains, are hypothesized to exert
(strong) negative inﬂuences on workers’ health and well-being, since the lack of
resources makes it diﬃcult to adequately cope with the high demand situation
and therefore cause strain reactions (Karasek, 1979). An extension of the basic
model includes social supported received from supervisors and colleagues as
third dimension. Social support is conjectured to moderate the negative eﬀects
of job strains.
The eﬀort-reward imbalance model analyzes the consequences of the per-
ceived imbalance between eﬀort (e.g., work pressure, job demands, motivation)
and reward (e.g., earnings, job security, acknowledgment) of a job (Siegrist,
1996). The main argument bases on the concept of reciprocity: A persistent
asymmetry between invested eﬀorts and received rewards impose a stressful
work environment with adverse eﬀects on well-being and health (Tsutsumi and
Kawakami, 2004). Low rewards are assumed to restrict status control and
thus eﬃcacy and self-esteem. In combination with high levels of spend eﬀorts
they increase the risk of poor health. The model hence focuses on the social
implications of working conditions.
Siegrist (1996) argues that many workers, who experience high-eﬀort/ low-
control situation have little discretion to decrease their eﬀort level. The usually
limited bargaining power of workers in those jobs makes renegotiation of working
conditions diﬃcult or impossible. High and hardly reducible eﬀort levels are not
restricted to blue collar workers, though. They could, for example, also occur
as part of (failed) career tournaments among high skilled white collar worker.
Empirical studies broadly conﬁrm the predictions of the models. Several
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies reveal a relation between the exposure to
high demand and low control conditions with the prevalence of health problems
like cardiovascular disease (van der Doef and Maes, 1998) and poor job-speciﬁc
4and general well-being of individuals (de Lange et al., 2003; van der Doef and
Maes, 1999). Also a permanent imbalance between eﬀorts and received rewards
contributes to poor health outcomes of workers (Tsutsumi and Kawakami, 2004).
Both approaches supplement each other by explaining diﬀerent dimensions of
the working condition-health nexus (Siegrist and Marmot, 2004): poor working
conditions deﬁned by high demands, low task-control and a gap between spend
eﬀort and received reward jointly correlate with an increased risk of adverse
health outcomes and overall reduced individual well-being (Ostry et al., 2003;
Tsutsumi and Kawakami, 2004).
Evidence on the path from job demands to retirement is limited, scattered
over time, comes from various social sciences, hence relies on diﬀerent theoretical
backgrounds, deﬁnitions, data set and covariates. Nonetheless, physical and
environmental demands appear to increase both the risk of early retirement (Filer
and Petri, 1988; Hayward et al., 1989) and disability retirement (Blekesaune
and Solem, 2005; Chirikos and Nestel, 1991; Hayward et al., 1998; Krause et al.,
1997). However, ﬁndings are not unambiguous, the eﬀect on the retirement
decision might be spurious and could disappear once one controls carefully
for workers’ characteristics, occupational pension plans and further working
conditions like the ability to alter working hours or the common retirement age
(Hurd and McGarry, 1993).
In addition, retirement appears to be contingent upon coping resources, like
task control. Lower levels of control are associated with earlier anticipated
age of retirement (Siegrist et al., 2006), actual early retirement, and even
disability retirement (Blekesaune and Solem, 2005). Furthermore, Hayward
et al. (1998); Hayward and Grady (1986); Hayward et al. (1989) conﬁrm a
positive relationship between a construct called “substantive complexity” (factor
capturing training intensity, mental aptitudes, and high control—comparable
to high demand and high control) and actual transition rates out of the labor
force; workers in complex jobs retire later.
However, the eﬀort-reward imbalance hypothesis receives mixed support in
the context of retirement decisions. There is some evidence from European
data (SHARE) that the anticipates retirement age declines with an imbalance
between eﬀort and reward at work (Siegrist et al., 2006). However, the same
data reveals no statistical dependency between eﬀort-reward imbalances and
the observed retirement pattern in the subsequent period, neither for men nor
5for women (Schmalzenberger et al., 2008).
In sum, previous research broadly supports the idea of job demand eﬀects on
the retirement decision. But most of the evidence comes from cross-sectional
data. Two studies, Hurd and McGarry (1993); Siegrist et al. (2006) use intended
instead of the observed retirement as dependent variable. In other cases,
Blekesaune and Solem (2005); Filer and Petri (1988), working environment
attributes are measured at the occupational level, which raises the question
whether occupational attributes are able to capture an individual’s experience.
An overall almost neglected topic are the consequences of dynamic matching
process of workers and jobs in the labor market and structural diﬀerences
between workers across job types. The revealed relations are thus best viewed
as associations.
2.2. Selection bias and the inﬂuence of job demands
Workers are not randomly assigned to jobs, but choose them based on individual
characteristics, preferences, job attributes, and available information (e.g., Blau
et al., 1956; Ham et al., 2009; Polachek, 1981). Job choice and job turnover are
dynamic processes. In other words, workers continue to change jobs over their
working life, for example, as part of job ladders, the arrival of new information
about job match quality, demand shifts, or in response to health shocks.
Assuming that each worker has a non-degenerated distribution of productivity
across jobs, there will be a distribution of diﬀerently productive workers for
every given job. Both market sides, workers and employers, should be in pursuit
of an optimal match under imperfect information. The quality of a match may
be unknown ex ante but is revealed over time with the duration of the job. Poor
quality matches will be resolved early, while separation probability declines
as the conﬁdence in the match grows over time (Jovanovic, 1979; Moscarini,
2005). On the workers’ side, match quality might translate into overall job
satisfaction levels (Clark, 2001). The quality of the job-worker match is most
likely associated with the retirement decision and at the same time related with
job demands (Rogerson et al., 2005). Furthermore, match quality may also
summarize the individual’s ability to cope with working conditions and thus
inﬂuence possible strain reactions.
As consequence of matching processes, workers will not only diﬀer by job-
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teristics. Highly demanding jobs are more frequent among workers with low
socioeconomic status (Rahkonen et al., 2006). But socioeconomic status is itself
associated with individual wealth, health outcomes, lifestyle in general, and
health related behavior in particular (Borg and Kristensen, 2000; Contoyannis
and Jones, 2004). Jobs with heavy demands will be an attractive alternative, if
they pay a wage premium that compensates workers for the health risks of stren-
uous working conditions (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). The structural diﬀerences
between workers will contribute to selection bias if these shared characteristics
are omitted from the analysis, while inﬂuencing the timing of retirement.
Closely related to general job-matching is the labor market behavior of
workers after or in anticipation of future productivity shocks, like deteriorating
health. Workers must not necessarily leave the labor force, but could instead
change into jobs with less adverse working conditions in order to reach an
otherwise determined retirement age. Lets for example assume that there is
a ‘true’ negative eﬀect of job demands on health. Frail workers might change
over the course of their career into less demanding jobs. Consequently, while
a positive selected group remains in demanding jobs, the average frailty in
less demanding working environments might increase as a cohort of workers
approaches retirement ages. A standard regression framework would in this
case underestimate the ‘true’ eﬀect of job demands.
Selection bias could therefore result from two related sources: matching
processes that inﬂuence the individual response to the degree of job demands.
As side-eﬀect of matching, workers with similar characteristics could cluster
within jobs with similar degrees of job demands. This selection will generally
take place independently of the retirement decision but could bias estimates
because covariates of treatment choice might relate to retirement as well. The
other source of selection bias is reverse causality. Observed job demands could
be the outcome of an otherwise determined retirement age. The consequence
would be a dependency between job demands and potential retirement outcomes.
The relevance of the bias will depend on the job mobility costs, foregone earnings
and the eligibility rules for alternatives outside of the labor market like early or
disability retirement.
The bias from self-selection has hardly been (explicitly) addressed in the
aforementioned studies on the working conditions, health and retirement nexus.
7The vast majority of research relies on cross-sectional data, does not attempt
to instrument the degree of observed job demands nor includes information
on individuals’ work history, which would help to control for time invariant
individual eﬀects and past career patterns. Inference relies almost exclusively
on information on the last job held prior to retirement conditioned on a limited
set of observed covariates (education, health, job characteristics). Job-match
quality is generally not included as regressor. Therefore, measured eﬀects are
likely to be a mixture of inﬂuence from current working conditions, individual
sorting, and accumulated eﬀects from past exposure.
Chirikos and Nestel (1991); Hayward et al. (1998) are two exceptions. Based
on US data, they can show that working conditions on the longest held job
and the last job prior to labor force exit have distinct eﬀects on the retirement
decision. The ﬁndings are however not conclusive. While Hayward et al.
(1998) report that high demand and low control jobs at higher ages raise the
probability to retire conditioned on covariate information on past working
conditions. The eﬀect of long-term exposure to adverse working conditions
seem to manifest mainly in poor health and therefore inﬂuences labor force exit
indirectly. Chirikos and Nestel (1991) instead ﬁnd a direct eﬀect of physically
and environmentally demanding working conditions during earlier stages of
careers on the transition probability particularly into disability but also non-
disability retirement. Characteristics of the current job have less clear eﬀects in
their study.
3. Empirical model and estimation strategy
Individuals retire if the expected present value from future pension beneﬁts
exceeds the present value of utility from labor earnings and the option value
to retire at a later, more beneﬁcial, point in time (Börsch-Supan et al., 2004;
Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999; Stock and Wise, 1990). The present value of
utility is a function of the indirect utility from net earnings till retirement and
the indirect utility from pension beneﬁts both discounted by the time preference
rate and the survival rate. The individual timing of retirement is therefore
mainly dependent on the pension plan and the earning stream till retirement.
Retirement pension plans are deﬁned by social security, occupational pensions,
private provisions, hence the national statuary framework. Earning streams
8depend mostly on job security, the development of an individual’s productivity
over age on a given job and features of the employment contract, like deferred
payment and fringe beneﬁts.
Poor health is the other main antecedent of the retirement decision and
constitute the major push factors. Health inﬂuences individual productivity and
earnings (budget constraint), might aﬀect and change the utility from leisure
and consumption (preferences), and ﬁnally should directly inﬂuence the timing
of retirement through its impact on the life expectancy (Dwyer and Mitchell,
1999; Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). Poor health severely reduces the work
capacity of individuals and can lead to disability retirement. Studies largely
conﬁrm that poor heath and adverse health shocks increase the likelihood of
retirement (Bound et al., 1999; Disney et al., 2006) even in the presence of
limited ﬁnancial resources (Bound et al., 2010). Generally, poor health appears
to dwarfs the eﬀects of ﬁnancial retirement incentives (Dwyer and Mitchell,
1999; McGarry, 2004).
Job demands may aﬀect the incentives to retire directly and indirectly. The
direct eﬀects works through the budget constraint and the marginal disutility of
work. Filer and Petri (1988) note that the eﬀect of marginal changes of working
conditions (e.g., as consequence of individual aging) on the retirement decision,
depends on the implied changes in the ratio of old-age productivity to lifetime
productivity and the ratio of old-age disutility to lifetime disutility from work.
If the change of the former were larger than of the latter, a change of working
conditions would lead to delayed retirement and vice versa. A part of the eﬀect
of job demands will however be mediated by health and therefore inﬂuence the
timing of retirement indirectly.
Let Di be a binary indicator that describes whether a worker i is engaged in
a job with highly demanding working conditions (Di = 1), or not (Di = 0). Ri
is the outcome variable and captures the transition into retirement of worker i
within a subsequent period of time. Since workers are not randomly assigned
to jobs but chose them as they chose the timing of retirement, it is necessary
to include a set of covariates Xi that relate to job choice and the retirement
decision, like the level of education, pension entitlements, and job match-
quality. Diﬀerences in job demands will then have a ceteris paribus eﬀect on
the retirement decision:
9Ri = E[Ri | X,D] + ϑi (1)
The expression summarizes the conjectured causal relationship of job demands on
an individual’s retirement decision holding other inﬂuences constant. The term
ϑi subsumes unobserved individual eﬀects that are independent of treatment
and the observed covariates.
Lets assume one could observe a worker i under both regimes (treated and





R1i = E[R1i | X] + ϑ1i if D = 1,
R0i = E[R0i | X] + ϑ0i if D = 0.
The actual retirement outcome Ri is a combination of the potential outcomes.
Ri = R0i + (R1i − R0i)D (2)
The individual causal eﬀect of high job demands (treatment) is (R1i − R0i).
Individuals however either work or do not work in jobs with demanding working
conditions and are thus only observed in one state. The unobserved outcome is
counterfactual.
From a policy point of view it would be beneﬁcial to have more knowledge on
the potential delay in retirement caused by a reduction of job demands for those
working under demanding conditions. The naive comparison of group-speciﬁc
diﬀerences will generally not suﬃce to provide this piece of information, because:
E[Ri | Di = 1] − E[Ri | Di = 0] (3)
ATT: = E[R1i − R0i | Di = 1]
Selection bias: + E[R0i | D = 1] − E[R0i | D = 0]
The ﬁst term, ATT, measures the average treatment eﬀect on the treated, which
is the potential diﬀerences in retirement outcomes had the workers in highly
demanding jobs (the treated) worked in less demanding jobs instead and hence
the ﬁgure of interest. The second term, selection bias, captures structural
diﬀerences in the average retirement probability between the treated and non-
treated workers that are not caused by treatment. On one hand, if there is
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with adverse health eﬀects, the naive diﬀerence will overestimated the ATT.
On the other, selection bias will be negative if frail workers select into less
demanding jobs. The term thus clouds the true eﬀect of job demands on the
retirement decision.
The key to identify the average treatment eﬀect on the treated is the con-
ditional independence assumption, which states that conditioned on a set of
covariates, treatment is as good as randomly assigned. In other words, con-
ditioned on observables the choice of treatment is independent of potential
outcomes and therefore exogenous. In mathematical terms:
{R1i,R0i} ⊥ ⊥ Di | Xi
Given the assumption holds, selection bias will vanish and the potential outcome
R0i of the treatment group can be correctly inferred from the outcome of the
non-treated workers. Lets assume that the conditional expectation of the control
outcome is linear in covariates and that the eﬀect of job demands is constant
across workers, then
R0i = X0
iβ + ϑ0i (4)
R1i = R0i + ρ (5)
Plugging the expressions into Eq. (2), yields
Ri = X0
iβ + ρDi + ϑ0i (6)
Under conditional independence, E[ϑ0i | Xi,Di] = 0, the causal parameter ρ
can be estimated by linear regression. Selection on observables is however a
strong assumption. Labor market outcomes are in most cases the result of
individual choice. It is not clear that all determinants can be generally observed.
Moreover, choice of treatment might depend on potential outcomes. Violation
of the conditional independence assumption would imply omitted variable bias.
Therefore, the study pursues two empirical strategy: Firstly, a regression
based approach to estimate the diﬀerences between the treatment and non-
treatment group. This approach uncovers the association between job demands
in the last job prior to retirement and the incidence of retirement. By successive
11addition of covariates it is possible to give information about the robustness of
the association.
A minor diﬃculty arises from the binary nature of the dependent variable.
The conditional expectation function equals in this case a probability with
values between zero and one. A linear probability model (LPM) will give
consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients, but might generate implausible ﬁtted
values. If the model is not saturated, the conditional expectation function will
be generally not linear in parameters. However, a LPM will still give the best
linear approximation. Especially if the explanatory variables are dummies and
the analysis focuses on average eﬀects, LPM can be an adequate estimation
machinery (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002).
Based on the causal model Eq. (6), the LPM is:
P(Ri = 1) = X0
iβ0 + β1 · Di + ei (7)
Since the dependent variable is Bernoulli distributed, the variance is a function
of the covariates and thus heteroscedastic.
If the nonlinearity of the conditional expectation function is explicitly taken
into account, the estimation model becomes
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This contrast with the corresponding standard error is estimated with the help
of the user written STATA program margeﬀ (Bartus, 2005).
The second estimation approach relies on longitudinal data and, additionally,
on an instrumental variable strategy. The level of job demands could be
correlated with ϑi, if there are for example omitted variables like anticipated
health shocks, past work experience, and past exposure to heavy job demands
that aﬀect selection into treatment. Moreover, the level of job demands is
overall determined by the job tasks, but workers should have at least limited
12discretion about individual eﬀorts. It is possible and even likely that selection
into jobs over the career and change in individual eﬀorts are dependent on
potential retirement age. The level of job choice could hence be an endogenous
variable in the retirement context, which implies that conditional independence
assumption cannot hold.
A very similar problem is described in Friedberg (2003). The author tries
to identify the eﬀect of computer use on the probability to retire. Like heavy
job demands, computer use, on the one hand, inﬂuences retirement, but on
the other, may itself depend on the planned retirement age. Computer skills
and their application are in other words not independent of potential out-
comes. Friedberg develops an instrumental variable strategy to exogenously
shift computer use. She suggests that industry and occupation speciﬁc means
of computer usage among prime-age workers can be appropriate instruments,
because these variables correlate, according to her, with individual computer use
but are, conditional on the other covariates, unrelated with potential outcomes
and unobserved individual characteristics. The eﬀect of computer use on the
retirement probability is then estimated by 2SLS.
This study adopts the strategy for the problem at hand, but additionally takes
advantage of the availability of longitudinal information on respondents’ main
job characteristics. The information allows to capture unobserved individual
characteristics related to job choice. The inclusion of information of heavy
job demands on the main job holds past work experience constant and would
therefore give information on the diﬀerence in retirement by workers with similar
background but currently varying job demands. In other words, heavy job
demands on the main job can be interpreted to measure the long run inﬂuence
of high workload on the retirement probability, while the treatment variable
will represent the retirement eﬀect of deviations from the mean workload. The
strategy is very similar to an within estimator, where the mean captures time
invariant unobserved individual preferences and characteristics between workers
and the current degree of job demand the inﬂuence of shifts within an individual
holding unobserved characteristics constant. The level of job demands on the
main job should per se be exogenous in the retirement decision, but probably
correlated with individual, not totally observable behavior.
Workload prior to retirement might, however, be related to the desired
retirement age. An appropriate instrumental variable must be redundant in the
13structural equation conditioned on the exogenous covariates. The instrument’s
inﬂuence on the outcome should conditional on other covariates only stem
from its association with treatment. An IV strategy overcomes the selection on
unobservable problem, by exogenously shifting the treatment variable. Similar to
Friedberg (2003), I construct possible instrumental variables from the industry-
and occupation-speciﬁc means of heavy job demand from persons, whose labor
market outcomes should not yet reﬂect retirement plans. The information
comes form respondents, who describe the job characteristics and workload
on their ﬁrst job during the SHARELIFE interview, but are not part of the
analyses because they are either not selected into the analyzed sample or have
missing data in basic covariates. The idea is that average workload on the
industry or occupational level describe the task ‘production function’ of jobs
and therefore the ‘technology’ induced level of workload that is required to
perform the speciﬁc set of tasks.
However, without the constant eﬀect assumption, IV uncovers only the eﬀect
of treatment for those whose treatment status is changed by the instrument.
The constant eﬀect assumption can technically not be true in limited depend
variable models. And unlike OLS, the commonly used 2SLS estimation does
not per se provide the best linear approximation to the underlying nonlinear
conditional expectation (Abadie, 2003; Angrist, 2001). Nonetheless, 2SLS
appears to produce estimates that are generally close to the average treatment
eﬀect also in the case of limited dependent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
4. Dataset, variables, and descriptive statistics
The analysis bases on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). SHARE is a large probability sample that contains comprehensive
and cross-nationally comparable data on the health status, socioeconomic and
sociodemographic characteristics, and the social networks of individuals born
in or before 1954 and their partners independently of age (Börsch-Supan et al.,
2005). SHARE oﬀers unique chances to investigate the retirement decision in
a broad context. Firstly, it provides a rich set of information on individual
characteristics, working conditions, health, and the labor market status of older
individuals. Secondly, the availability of two successive waves and life history
data from SHARELIFE allows to observe transition into retirement and job
14changes contingent upon past work experiences. And thirdly, the cross-national
variation in the cultural and institutional setting makes it possible to assess the
eﬀect of job demands under distinct yet not completely diﬀerent retirement and
pension systems.
The ﬁrst wave of SHARE was conducted in twelve countries in the years
2004 and 2005: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and later Israel. Longitudinal
information for the original eleven countries and additional data from the Czech
Republic, Ireland, and Poland became available with the release of the second
wave that was ﬁelded 2 years later in 2006/2007. The third wave, SHARELIFE,
was made public in November 2010. It supplements the collected information
with life history data of the respondents prior to the ﬁrst SHARE interview.
This study focuses on persons aged 50 and older of either gender, who are
employed and have not yet reached the country and gender-speciﬁc normal
retirement age at the time of the ﬁrst interview. It is assumed that persons aged
50 and older are at risk of retirement. In most countries, the selected workers
belong to the age group 50–64. Retirement is deﬁned as an absorbing state.
The normal retirement ages were taken from Kalwij and Vermeulen (2008)
and updated if necessary by information from the Social Security Programs
Throughout the World – Project (Social Security Administration, 2006); see
Appendix A for detailed values.
Information on the treatment and control variables from 2004 is used to
explain labor force exit cessation within the following two years. The variables
are therefore predetermined in the subsequent retirement decision. The ap-
proach also provides a well deﬁned counterfactual, namely economic activity
or inactivity, respectively. The higher data requirements limit the number of
observations to roughly 4,500 individuals in the analysis.
The decision to retire is in most countries analyzed over an age bracket of 15
years. Many European pension system have however been subject to reforms
in the last two decade, for example, to eliminate early retirement incentives.
Workers who are currently in their 50es experience or will experience other
conditions and eligibility rules than older cohorts. The frame of the retirement
decision diﬀers. Thus, the question arises to what extent estimated eﬀects
among ‘older’ old workers can predict behavior of ‘younger’ old workers, and
vice versa. The likelihood of retirement will grow considerably as workers
15approach the national early retirement thresholds (Zamarro et al., 2008). In
other words, retirement before age 60 is likely to be the exemption, while
retirement after age 60 is the rule. Therefore, I estimate the model in the total
sample, but also separately for workers aged 59 and older and workers below 59.
Transition into retirement is the dependent variable and deﬁned as the change
in individual labor market status from employed (including self-employment) to
economic inactivity between the two consecutive interviews. Economic inactivity
comprises retirement, disability retirement, and homemaker. For simplicity, I
will refer to these diﬀerent states as retirement. The average transition rate is
about 17 percent in the total sample. There is however strong variation across
age groups: while the transition rate is about 11 percent in the age group 50–58,
it reaches around 43 percent at ages 59 and older.
Exposure to heavy job demands on the primary job in 2004 constitutes the
treatment variable. SHARE includes two questions about job demands: the
degree of physical workload and the experience of constant time pressure in the
respondent’s primary job. Responses are coded on a 4-level Likert scale from
one “strongly agree” to four “strongly disagree”. A sum score of two or three is
deﬁned as heavy job demands. In other words, heavy job demands are the sum
of high physical and psychological workloads. The measure does not directly
describe hazardous environments, nor the risk of work injuries in general, instead
it focuses on the exposure to stressors and unfavorable working conditions that
can have adverse health consequences and may alter the preference for leisure
and consumption. According to this deﬁnition, around 20 percent of workers in
the sample are exposed to heavy job demands.
Eﬀects of job demands, for example on health, might accumulate over the
career and the degree of job demands in 2004 will most likely depend on the
past levels of workload. The data on heavy job demand on the main job is taken
from SHARELIFE. The dataset allows to identify the main job in workers’
careers and to assess the degree of workload based on the same items as in
standard SHARE. The main job is either directly derived from the response to
the corresponding item or, if not available (still working), deﬁned as the job
with the longest duration (lasting at least ﬁve years) during the employment
history till 2004. Main job and primary job in 2004 must not be distinct from
each other. In fact, only slightly more than a quarter of the population at risk
of retirement has stopped to work in the main job by 2004. Again around 20
16percent of the workers report exposure to heavy job demands. It is clear that
heavy job demands on the main job increase the frequency of reported heavy
job demands on the last job.
The explanatory power of the estimated eﬀect of heavy job demands depends
on the included control variables. Covariates should simultaneously have an
inﬂuence on the probability of treatment and the retirement decision. Their
realization should be determined before treatment status is selected. Firstly, a
set of birth year dummies ranging from 1940 to 1954, country dummies, and a
gender dummy variable are included in the regression. The variables capture
the systematic diﬀerences in the retirement dynamics. These variables are
mainly meant to increase the precision of the estimates. However, they may
also capture diﬀerences in the probability of treatment, for example, as result of
national variation in the industry structure, gender-speciﬁcities in the average
exposure to heavy job demands, or shifts in the degree of job demands over
birth cohorts as a consequence of structural change. Distribution of gender and
birth year does not diﬀer by treatment status. But there are country diﬀerences:
The fraction of Italian, Danish, and Greek workers reporting heavy job demands
is signiﬁcantly above the values in the control group. Older workers from the
Netherlands, Spain, France, and Switzerland report on the contrary a lower
frequency of heavy job demands (Table 1).
Secondly, the level of educational achievement grouped into broad ISCED
categories capture diﬀerences in potential earnings, health and related behavior,
and therefore general socioeconomic status. Educational achievement diﬀerenti-
ates between no formal education, primary or lower secondary (low), secondary
or upper secondary (medium), and tertiary (high) level of education. It is ex-
ogenously given in the retirement decision and helps to disentangle the inﬂuence
of heavy job demands from individual background. Heavy job demands are
signiﬁcantly more prevalent among workers with lower educational achievement
(Table 1).
Thirdly, selection into treatment and retirement will correlate with charac-
teristic of the employment relation. Employers, for example, could have an
interest to provide diﬀerent retirement schemes depending on the degree of
job demands. On the one hand, if heavy job demands inﬂuence health and
work capacity, employers might provide means to facilitate the transition into
retirement like occupational pensions and early retirement schemes, also as
17Table 1: Descriptive statistics of covariates by treatment status (Source:
SHARE, own calculations)
Di = 0 Di = 1 diﬀ.
(N = 3,081) (N = 751)
Year of birth 1948.7 (3.652) 1948.9 (3.706) −0.195 [0.149]
Female 0.447 (0.497) 0.434 (0.496) 0.013 [0.020]
Austria 0.044 (0.205) 0.056 (0.230) −0.012 [0.009]
Germany 0.097 (0.296) 0.116 (0.320) −0.019 [0.012]
Sweden 0.191 (0.394) 0.164 (0.370) 0.028∗ [0.016]
Netherlands 0.103 (0.304) 0.052 (0.222) 0.051∗∗∗ [0.012]
Spain 0.049 (0.215) 0.025 (0.157) 0.023∗∗∗ [0.008]
Italy 0.056 (0.230) 0.088 (0.283) −0.032∗∗∗ [0.010]
France 0.108 (0.311) 0.083 (0.275) 0.026∗∗ [0.012]
Denmark 0.101 (0.301) 0.136 (0.343) −0.035∗∗∗ [0.013]
Greece 0.057 (0.232) 0.095 (0.293) −0.037∗∗∗ [0.010]
Switzerland 0.066 (0.249) 0.045 (0.208) 0.021∗∗ [0.010]
Belgium 0.127 (0.333) 0.141 (0.348) −0.014 [0.014]
ISCED (none) 0.011 (0.103) 0.021 (0.144) −0.011∗∗ [0.005]
ISCED (low) 0.275 (0.447) 0.352 (0.478) −0.077∗∗∗ [0.018]
ISCED (medium) 0.366 (0.482) 0.362 (0.481) 0.004 [0.020]
ISCED (high) 0.344 (0.475) 0.258 (0.438) 0.085∗∗∗ [0.019]
Privat pension 0.597 (0.491) 0.529 (0.500) 0.068∗∗∗ [0.020]
Early ret. possibil-
ity
0.587 (0.492) 0.491 (0.500) 0.096∗∗∗ [0.020]
Job satisfaction 0.942 (0.233) 0.877 (0.328) 0.065∗∗∗ [0.010]
Self employed 0.139 (0.346) 0.236 (0.425) −0.097∗∗∗ [0.015]
Excellent h. 0.203 (0.402) 0.184 (0.388) 0.019 [0.016]
Very good h. 0.306 (0.461) 0.256 (0.437) 0.050∗∗∗ [0.019]
Good h. 0.388 (0.487) 0.426 (0.495) −0.039∗ (0.020)
Fair h. 0.093 (0.291) 0.115 (0.319) −0.0214∗ [0.012]
Poor h. 0.011 (0.104) 0.020 (0.140) −0.009∗ [0.005]
Note: The sample includes all SHARE respondents who were aged 50 and older and employed
at the ﬁrst interview, with a valid observation on employment status in the second wave. Std.
dev in(), std. errors in [], ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
18part of the compensation scheme (Filer and Petri, 1988). On the other, de-
layed payment contracts typically found among higher and lower services bias
retirement incentives (Lazear, 1979). Occupational pension schemes and early
retirement windows could be an attractive option for both sides to promote
retirement in this case. Therefore measure of entitlements to private pension
including occupation pension and early retirement opportunities might relate
to treatment and observed retirement behavior. In fact, more than half of the
workers in both groups report to have private pension claims and still around
the half has the opportunity to retire early, that is before a ‘normal’ age. Both
fractions are clearly higher among workers in less demanding jobs (Table 1).
The quality of job match and the availability of resources to cope with heavy
job demands are further potentially important pieces of information and are
approximated by job satisfaction. A workers who is satisﬁed with his or her job
despite strenuous working conditions is conjectured to be able to compensate
adverse inﬂuences. SHARE covers overall satisfaction with the primary job by
a single 4-level Likert item. The response categories are dichotomized. The
dummy variable takes the value one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees
with the statement “All things considered I am satisﬁed with my job”. The
information is available for the job held in 2004. Average job satisfaction is high
(Table 1); around 94 percent of workers in the control group and 88 percent
of workers in jobs with heavy demands are satisﬁed with their job. It might
indicates that either only high quality matches survive or that only high quality
matches are formed. The reported diﬀerence in the average frequency of satisﬁed
workers is highly signiﬁcantly.
Independently of other covariate, self-employment is generally found to be
associated with delayed retirement. The data additionally reveals that the
frequency of heavy job demands is signiﬁcantly higher among self-employed
workers than among employees (Table 1). Self-employment appears to be an
attractive alternative to retirement (Fuchs, 1982) and at same time may be
associated with non-pecuniary rewards (Hamilton, 2000), decision latitude and
other resources to successfully counteract high levels of workload.
Individual health is a further main determinant of retirement, which may at
the same time possibly correlate with the treatment variable. Health status is
conjectured to be contingent upon the degree of job demands. Controlling for
health status would thus close a channels through which heavy job demands
19might inﬂuence the retirement decision. However, seeing as health is best
deﬁned as stock, a change in working conditions is unlikely to reveal short-term
inﬂuences but will impact health over the long run. Therefore, conditioning
on health would lead to an estimate of the short term inﬂuence of treatment.
Self-assessed health status is measured on a cardinal scale ranging in ﬁve steps
from ‘excellent’ to ‘poor’. Slightly more than 10 percent of respondents in the
investigated subsample report poor or fair health status (Table 1). Excellent
and very good health status is much more common, about 50 percent of workers
in less demanding jobs and 44 percent in the treatment group report a very
good health status or better. Overall, treated workers have a slightly higher
chance to report less than very good health. But looking at single levels, only
the contrast in very good health status turns out to be clearly statistically
signiﬁcant.
Fourthly, there might be general occupation and industry speciﬁc eﬀects on
treatment probability and retirement patterns, such as job stability, decision
autonomy, and other speciﬁcities of the work environment, but also diﬀerences
in socioeconomic status. Occupations are organized into major ISCO88 groups.
The list of industry bases on the NACE coding schema. The two sets of
dummy variables will measure general diﬀerences in retirement and treatment
selection between individuals. By holding occupation and industry constant
in the estimation, the coeﬃcient of heavy job demands will pick up the eﬀect
within an industry-occupation cell. In other words, treatment receipts are
compared to non-treated workers within the same cell. It is furthermore crucial
to include occupational and industry level dummies in the estimation, because
the instrumental variables capture job demands on the same level of aggregation.
Statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuences of the industry and occupation dummies in
the main equation may indicate a direct aggregate workload eﬀects and hence
violation of the redundancy assumption.
Heavy job demands occur across the whole range of industries and occupations.
But the frequency clearly diﬀers: Workers in agriculture, construction and low
skilled services like transport, storage and communication, and health and social
work are signiﬁcantly more likely to work in jobs with heavy demands. Overall,
it appears to be a contrast between on the one side (high) skilled white collar
workers who tend to report lower levels of job demands, and blue collar and low
skilled white collar workers with a higher frequency of strenuous job demands
20Table 2: Industry and occupation dummies by treatment (Source: SHARE, own
calculations)
Di = 0 Di = 1 diﬀ.
Agriculture and ﬁshing 0.0058 (0.0762) 0.028 (0.165) −0.0221∗∗∗ [0.004]
Mining 0.0036 (0.0597) 0.0067 (0.0814) −0.0031 [0.003]
Manufacturing 0.156 (0.363) 0.136 (0.343) 0.0203 [0.015]
Electricity, gas, water 0.0094 (0.0966) 0.0067 (0.0814) 0.0028 [0.004]
Construction 0.0523 (0.223) 0.101 (0.302) −0.0489∗∗∗ [0.010]
Wholesale and retail 0.0682 (0.252) 0.0812 (0.273) −0.0131 [0.010]
Hotels and restaurants 0.0140 (0.117) 0.0280 (0.165) −0.0140∗∗∗ [0.005]
Transport, storage, communi-
cation
0.0510 (0.220) 0.0692 (0.254) −0.0183∗∗ [0.009]
Financial intermediation 0.0373 (0.190) 0.0107 (0.103) 0.0267∗∗∗ [0.007]
Real estate, renting, business
activities
0.0730 (0.260) 0.0439 (0.205) 0.0291∗∗∗ [0.010]
Public administration and de-
fense
0.107 (0.309) 0.0599 (0.237) 0.0472∗∗∗ [0.012]
Education 0.132 (0.339) 0.0759 (0.265) 0.0562∗∗∗ [0.013]
Health and social work 0.137 (0.344) 0.198 (0.399) −0.0611∗∗∗ [0.015]
Other community, social and
personal services
0.0474 (0.213) 0.0386 (0.193) 0.0088 [0.009]
Other or Missing 0.105 (0.307) 0.116 (0.320) −0.0104 [0.013]
Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and 0.134 (0.340) 0.125 (0.331) 0.0086 [0.014]
Professionals 0.216 (0.412) 0.128 (0.334) 0.0883∗∗∗ [0.016]
Technicians and associate pro-
fessionals
0.191 (0.394) 0.148 (0.355) 0.0437∗∗∗ [0.016]
Clerks 0.122 (0.327) 0.0506 (0.219) 0.0714∗∗∗ [0.013]
Services and sales workers 0.0951 (0.293) 0.129 (0.336) −0.0341∗∗∗ [0.012]
Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery
workers
0.0204 (0.142) 0.0692 (0.254) −0.0488∗∗∗ [0.007]
Craft and related workers 0.0675 (0.251) 0.146 (0.354) −0.0790∗∗∗ [0.011]
Plant and machine operators
and ass
0.0545 (0.227) 0.0692 (0.254) −0.0147 [0.009]
Elementary occupations 0.0649 (0.246) 0.0999 (0.300) −0.0350∗∗∗ [0.011]
Other or Missing 0.0341 (0.181) 0.0346 (0.183) −0.0005 [0.007]
Note: The sample includes all SHARE respondents who were aged 50 and older and employed
at the ﬁrst interview, with a valid observation on employment status in the second wave. Std.
dev in(), std. errors in [], ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
21Table 3: Measurement quality of the treatment variable (Source: SHARE, own
calculations)
Di = 0 Di = 1 diﬀ.
(N = 3,858) (N = 984)
Functional lim. 0.266 (0.442) 0.339 (0.474) −0.075
∗∗∗ [0.016]
Health limits 0.234 (0.423) 0.455 (0.498) −0.221
∗∗∗ [0.016]
Retirement asap 0.426 (0.495) 0.575 (0.495) −0.149
∗∗∗ [0.018]
Rounded to three decimal places. Std. dev in (), s.e. in [],
∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
on the other side (Table 2).
5. Results
5.1. Heavy job demands: Does it measure what it is supposed to
measure?
For starters, it would be helpful to know whether, the variable of interest actually
relates to outcomes that are generally associated with heavy job demands. The
demand-control and eﬀort-reward imbalance models suggest that heavy job
demands should be negatively associated with health outcomes, work capacity,
and lastly retirement intentions. To assess the quality of the deﬁned treatment
variable, I test if it can capture those diﬀerences in the data.
The prevalence of functional limitations (disability), the fear health limits
the ability to work till regular retirement on the given job, and the stated
preference for retirement as soon as possible are all signiﬁcantly lower in the
control-group than among treatment receipts (Table 3). Noteworthy, almost
half of the workers with heavy job demands fear health is limiting their ability
to work till regular retirement on the current job, compared to a fraction of
not even a quarter in the control group. The results overall indicate a clear
association of the deﬁned treatment variable with usual outcomes of heavy job
demands.
22Table 4: Retirement by treatment status and age group. (Source: SHARE, own
calculations)
Di = 0 Di = 1 diﬀ.
Total (N = 4,836) 0.167 (0.373) 0.190 (0.392) −0.023
∗ [0.0135]
≤58 (N = 3,891) 0.109 (0.311) 0.114 (0.319) −0.006 [0.0124]
>58 (N = 945) 0.404 (0.491) 0.514 (0.501) −0.110
∗∗∗[0.0404]
Std. dev in (), s.e. in [],
∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.2. Heavy job demands and the incidence of retirement
Table 4 summarizes the simple diﬀerence between retirement probabilities
across treatment and age stratiﬁed samples. Overall, the average diﬀerence
in retirement probability is negligible in the total sample as well as in the
younger subsample. But, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average retirement
probability by treatment among the older workers in the conjectured direction
across European countries.
The ﬁndings reveal a mixed picture of the association between heavy job
demands and retirement. The probability of very early retirement, possibly
driven by poor health, does not diﬀer by treatment status. However, it seems
that as workers become eligible to regular pension beneﬁts, the retirement
probabilities jump up particularly among workers in jobs with a high workload.
Around a half of the workers in this group had retired within the following two
years; about 11 percentage points more than in the control group. Remarkably,
the observed probability of retirement in the age group 59 and older closely
coincide with the stated preference for retirement as early as possible in Table 3.
The question in the following is, what of the univariate (lack of) diﬀerences
is due to selection bias and what reﬂects the causal inﬂuence of heavy job
demands.
Estimation results of the regression Eq. (7) and the probit model Eq. (8)
are displayed in Table 5. Apparently, the basic ﬁndings remain intact: there
is a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between heavy job and the average
retirement probability in European countries, but only in the older age-group.
The estimated contrast in the LPM is about 9 percentage point independently
23of model speciﬁcation, which is below but sill close to the simple diﬀerence in
means between both groups.
In the younger and total sample, there is overall no conclusive statistical
evidence for a relationship between heavy job demands and retirement (ﬁrst and
second panel in Table 5). Just with the basic set of covariates, the estimated
coeﬃcient in the total sample turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level. Still, the conﬁdence level of a positive relationship between heavy
job demands is 96%. However, by successive inclusion of covariates, the point
estimates decline in the total and younger sample, while standard errors hardly
change. If heavy job demands had strong adverse health eﬀects, one would
expect to observe clearer diﬀerences in the retirement probability also among
workers aged 58 and below. But it might as well be possible that because of
sample size limitations, there were just not suﬃcient transitions from work to
(disability) retirement below age 59 to precisely estimate the diﬀerence.
The estimated coeﬃcient in the older subsample is roughly constant across
model speciﬁcations (third panel in Table 5). The included covariates either do
not strongly correlate with treatment status or have only a weak inﬂuence on
retirement. Still, there are subtle variations. Especially the inclusion of dummy
variables for educational levels, industry, and occupation reduce the magnitude
of the estimated contrast (LPM-3). Thus a part of the eﬀect of heavy job
demands stems from diﬀerences between educational levels, occupation and
industry. But there is still substantial variation in heavy job demand and
retirement behavior within education-industry-occupation cells.
Adding the entitlements to private pensions, early retirement opportunities,
job satisfaction, self-employment status, and health slightly increase the point
estimate. The explanation is as follows. Private pension claims as well as early
retirement opportunities are negatively correlated with treatment status, but
contribute to a raised probability of retirement (positive correlation). Their
inclusion must hence increase the estimated coeﬃcient of heavy job demands.
Self-employment status has a similar ‘inﬂating’ inﬂuence on the inﬂuence of
treatment, but for opposite reasons: it is more prevalent among workers with
heavy job demands (positive correlation), and associated with lower retirement
probabilities (negative correlation). Job satisfaction and health status, on the
other hand, are on average lower in the treated than in the control group
(negative correlation) and at the same time associated with a lower transition
24Table 5: Association of heavy job demands with retirement. (Source: SHARE,
own calculations)
Heavy job demands LPM-1 LPM-2 LPM-3 LPM-4 Probit
Total 0.022
∗ 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
N 4,836 4,836 4,836 3,832 3,816
R
2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25
≤ 58 0.007 0.001 −0.001 −0.010 −0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
N 3,891 3,891 3,891 3,049 3,033
R







(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042)
N 945 945 945 783 783
R
2 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.29
Covariates:
Birth year, country, gender
√ √ √ √ √
Educational level
√ √ √ √
Industry, Occupation
√ √ √
Pension claims, job satisfaction,
health, self-employment
√ √
Std. errors in ();
∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
See Appendix B for detailed results.
25rate into retirement (negative correlation). They would thus each ceteris paribus
narrow the gap in the retirement probability between both groups. Apparently,
the correlation of the pension variables and self-employment with retirement
and heavy job demands overcompensates the inﬂuence of job satisfaction and
health in the older age group.
The diﬀerence between LPM-3 and LPM-4 is that in the former speciﬁcation
a worker within a given education-industry-occupation cell is assumed to change
not only the degree of job demands but also associated attributes (improved
pension scheme, lower probability of self-employment, becomes more satisﬁed
and healthier), while in the latter case job characteristics and health are held
constant. The comparison in LPM-4 is hence based on identically healthy
workers in similar ‘lousy’ jobs. However, at health status and job satisfaction
might change over the long run, if the degree of job demands were altered. The
coeﬃcient in LPM-4 is thus best viewed as short term inﬂuence. But since the
relationship is only signiﬁcant in the older age-group and cessation of labor
force participation will most certainly occur within a rather short time period,
it seems plausible to concentrate on LPM-4 for inference.
Since neither of the models is saturated, the LPM only approximates the
underlying conditional expectation function. Results of RESET tests clearly
indicate the presence of neglected nonlinearities. To check the reliability of
the ﬁndings, the fully speciﬁed model is re-estimated by probit using Eq. (8).1
Results are reported as average discrete eﬀects (probit column in Table 5). They
give, like in the LPM case, the average diﬀerence in retirement probabilities by
treatment status. The estimated contrasts are virtually identical to results of
LPM-4 even in the younger subsample with its very low retirement rate. The
simple linear model appears to approximate the eﬀect of interest reasonably
well.
The previous estimates represent associations, in other words the diﬀerence
in retirement probability between workers in jobs with heavy workload and less
strenuous working conditions prior to retirement. The ﬁndings largely mirror
the results in the extant literature, with the exemption of the clear age gradient
of the retirement contrast. But observed diﬀerences must not necessarily reﬂect
1A discrete choice model has the additional advantage to resemble a special type of duration
model in this context.
26the average eﬀect of heavy job demands per se, but could result from other
unobserved but correlated inﬂuences like accumulated work experiences, past
exposure to heavy job demands, or expectation concerning the development of
individual work capacity and well-being. Thus, they do not answer the question
how would the retirement decision change, if a worker changed from heavy to
lower job demands.
5.3. Alleviated job demands – delayed retirement?
The question is tackled in two steps: ﬁrstly, exposure to heavy job demands on
the main job is included as covariate in the estimation of Eq. (7). Depending
on the result, one or both of the instrumental variables are chosen to, secondly,
treat the current level of job demand as endogenous. The IV estimation is
performed by two stage least squares (2SLS). In the ﬁrst stage, the current
level of job demand is regressed on the exogenous variables. The ﬁtted values
are used in the second stage to replace the possible endogenous explanatory
variable in the structural equation.
According to the data, heavy job demands on the main job strongly correlate
with the job demands in the current position (Table 6). The diﬀerence between
treatment receipts and non-receipts in the frequency of high workload levels on
the main job is substantial, above 30 percentage points, and highly signiﬁcant.
Note the reduced number of observations, which results from panel attrition and
item non-response. The potential instruments show the anticipated pattern, the
frequency of heavy job demands are signiﬁcantly higher in the treatment group.
The variability of the potential instrumental variables is limited, since they are
deﬁned at a high level of aggregation, which may have adverse inﬂuences on
the precision of the 2SLS standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
The inclusion of heavy job demands on the main job in the estimation supports,
on one hand, previous ﬁndings: workload matters in the older subsample, but
not among the younger fraction of workers at the risk of retirement. Additionally
inclusion of covariates reduces the eﬀect of workload in the total sample, whereas
the point estimate increases in the older subsample. But on the other hand, the
results reveal that rather than the workload level prior to retirement, long-run
exposure over the career to heavy job demands aﬀects the retirement probability
(Table 7).
27Table 6: Distribution of past and average job demands by treatment status.
(Source: SHARE, own calculations)
Di = 0 Di = 1 diﬀ.
Heavy demands, main job,
(D0 = 2,137/D1 = 577)
0.126 (0.332) 0.437 (0.496) −0.311
∗∗∗ [0.018]
IV: heavy job demands – av-
erage (ISCO88 1digit), (D0 =
3,773/D1 = 945)
0.209 (0.103) 0.262 (0.116) −0.053
∗∗∗ [0.004]
IV: heavy job demands – av-
erage (NACE 1digit), (D0 =
3,491/D1 = 852)
0.195 (0.0861) 0.235 (0.0988) −0.040
∗∗∗ [0.003]
Std. dev in (), s.e. in [];
∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Conditioned on the workload on the main job, i.e. average exposure to heavy
job demands over the career, workload prior to retirement, i.e. the deviation
from the average, has no eﬀect on the retirement probability. Workers who were
exposed to heavy job demands on the main job have a 14–15 percentage point
higher probability of retirement. There is however no indication of increased
disability retirement or very early labor force cessation as response to heavy job
demands. Furthermore, high workload on the current job does not matter in
the subsequent retirement decision. A reduction of workload of treated workers
in the population at risk of retirement would, in other words, not lead to a
change of the retirement probability on the average.
As previously mentioned, the current level of heavy job demand may be
endogenous. Seeing as heavy workload is indeed associated with higher transition
rates into retirement, workers could decide to either change job or lower work
eﬀort to reach an otherwise determined retirement age.
The potential instruments vary on the level of one digit industry and occupa-
tion classiﬁcation. It is therefore important to have information on the industry
and occupation-speciﬁc inﬂuences on individual retirement (Friedberg, 2003).
Independent of age bracket sample and included covariates, the set of industry
dummies is jointly signiﬁcant at conﬁdence levels above 99%. It is therefore
impossible to rule out a direct inﬂuence of industry-speciﬁc workload averages
28Table 7: The retirement eﬀects of current and past levels of job demands.
(Source: SHARE, SHARELIFE, own calculations)
LPM-5 LPM-6 2SLS-1 2SLS-2
Total
Heavy job demands (current) −0.001 0.001 0.040 −0.091
(0.018) (0.021) (0.138) (0.172)
Heavy job demands (main) 0.033
∗ 0.029 0.019 0.051
(0.019) (0.021) (0.044) (0.055)
N 2,708 2,151 2,640 2,116
R-sq 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.26
F-value (1st stage) 55.32 35.57
≤ 58
Heavy job demands (current) −0.020 −0.019 0.092 −0.091
(0.018) (0.021) (0.147) (0.185)
Heavy job demands (main) 0.013 −0.001 −0.019 0.010
(0.019) (0.022) (0.045) (0.054)
N 2,076 1,624 2,017 1,595
R-sq 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.15
1st F-value 43.28 25.97
> 58
Heavy job demands (current) 0.053 0.052 −0.372 −0.475
(0.050) (0.057) (0.376) (0.511)





(0.052) (0.062) (0.150) (0.217)
N 632 527 623 521
R-sq 0.29 0.34 0.19 0.20
1st F-value 10.87 6.71
Instrument: Average workload
Covariates:
Birth year, country, gender
√ √ √ √
Educational level
√ √ √ √
Industry dummies
√ √ √ √
Occupation dummies
√ √
Pension claims, Health, job
satisfaction, self-employment
√ √
Std. dev in (), s.e. in [];
∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
See Appendix B for detailed results.
29on the individual retirement decision. The set of occupation dummies is, on the
contrary, jointly signiﬁcant at conﬁdence levels below 50%—again independent
of sample and included set of covariates. Aggregate occupation eﬀects can thus
be excluded from the structural equation.
Instrumental variable estimates are reported in Table 7. Column 2SLS-
1 includes basic demographic covariates, education and industry dummies
as exogenous covariates, whereas 2SLS-2 extends the list to pension scheme
characteristics, health, job satisfaction, and self-employment status. Firstly,
there is in every speciﬁcation a valid ﬁrst stage; the instrument is able to explain
a signiﬁcant fraction of variation in individual heavy job demand. Secondly,
compared to LPM-5 and LPM-6 ﬁndings, there is again no statistical signiﬁcant
eﬀect of heavy workload, past or current, on overall retirement behavior and
very early retirement. OLS and 2SLS results are not distinct from one an other.
Thus the lack of an association in the previous section is not driven by selection
bias but by the absence of an underlying eﬀect. A fraction of workers between
age 50 and 58 in the dataset in fact retires, but for other reasons than heavy
workload.
Thirdly, the picture remains diﬀerent in the older subsample. Still, current
treatment has like in LPM-6 and LPM-5 no eﬀect on retirement. The point
estimates drastically drop to negative values in fact, but the standard errors are
too large to draw further conclusions. However, the eﬀect of past workload is
still weakly signiﬁcant but with an escalated estimated coeﬃcient compared to
OLS. Based on 2SLS-1, heavy job demands on the main job rise the retirement
probability by 28 percentage points. Treating current heavy job demand
as endogenous has a clear inﬂuence on the estimated coeﬃcient of ‘average’
workload. The reason might be the strong correlation between both variables,
i.e. the attributed inﬂuence of one variable determines the inﬂuence, which is left
over for the other. Holding other important covariates like retirement scheme,
self-employment and job-satisfaction ﬁx at their levels prior to retirement, the
eﬀect of past workload even increases to almost 36 percentage point (2SLS-2).
The instability of the point estimates between 2SLS-1 and 2SLS-2 indicates
a undesirable sensitivity of the instrument to the included covariate. The
instrument is not randomly assigned to workers and does thus not constitutes a
‘quasi-experiment’. It describes features of the task production function in broad
occupational groups and therefore the limits of individual discretion over job
30demands within occupations. Its validity hinges on the ability to conditioning
out all confounding inﬂuences, i.e. there should be no omitted variables. This
suggests that 2SLS-2 is more reliable as it includes additional covariates which
are obviously associated with the instrument. Still, the IV estimates conﬁrm
the longitudinal OLS ﬁndings.
6. Conclusions
Growth of labor force participation at older ages is a current political goal in
the EU. The eﬀectiveness of achievement will depend among other things on
the ability of workers to delay retirement.
Previous research suggests that heavy job demands are stressors with potential
adverse health eﬀects. Adequate resources on the job may however mitigate
the negative inﬂuence of stressful situations. Resources refer, for example, to
task control, pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, and job-match quality. The
study tackles two questions: Is there a negative inﬂuence of heavy job demands
on delayed retirement and if there is an eﬀect, would a reduction lead to lower
retirement probability among those who are exposed to heavy workload. To
answer the questions, I use the available waves of SHARE. SHARE collects
data in several European countries and allows thus to investigate the eﬀect
of heavy job demands conditional on diﬀerent public pension systems. Heavy
job demands are deﬁned as the combination of permanent physical eﬀorts and
constant time pressure.
The results indicate the following. Firstly, around 20% of the workers are
exposed to heavy job demands. But the probability of heavy job demands is
not equally distributed. Workers with low levels of education, in blue and low
skilled white collar occupations are more likely to report high levels of workload.
Furthermore, heavy job demands is positively related to functional limitations,
the fear that health will limit the ability to work till the normal retirement age,
and the intention to retire as soon as one becomes eligible to pension beneﬁts.
Secondly, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the observed retirement patterns,
but only among workers aged 59 and older. Retirement in the age bracket
50–58 is not associated heavy job demands. Multivariate regression support
this ﬁndings.
However, workers may select into less demanding jobs or reduce eﬀorts on
31a give job to lower workload and reach a desired retirement age. On the one
hand, selection may lead to an overestimation of true workload eﬀects, if high
workload is associated with individual characteristics that favor early retirement.
On the other, selection may contribute to an underestimation of the true eﬀect,
if for example frail workers will choose to change into jobs with lower levels
of workload. Observed workload may thus be an endogenous variable in the
retirement decision.
To disentangle the eﬀect of heavy workload from selection process, I use,
thirdly, an instrumental variable strategy and include additional available
information on the degree of job demands on a respondent’s main job. Job
demands on the main job can be interpreted as mean workload over the career,
which correlates with time invariant unobserved individual characteristics, while
current job demands capture the eﬀect of deviations from this mean. The
instrumental variable is deﬁned as average heavy job demand across broad
occupational groups. OLS and 2SLS results are very similar. They indicate that
neither current nor past exposure to heavy job demands has a retirement eﬀect
in the age group 50–58. However, in the age-group 59 and older, past exposure
has a clear average eﬀect on retirement. It seems, that once workers become
eligible to pension beneﬁts long-term exposure to heavy job demands and the
associated individual characteristics lead to a higher probability of labor force
cessation. A reduction in workload prior to retirement has generally no eﬀect.
In terms of the political agenda, the results are not conclusive. On the one
hand, they indicate that heavy job demands are neither related to very early
retirement, nor disability retirement, and most of the eﬀect in the older subsam-
ple is independent of health. On the other hand, workers with a employment
history in demanding jobs have on average a higher retirement probability, once
they reach the eligibility age for (old age and early) retirement. A reduction
in workload prior to retirement does not reduce the probability of labor force
cessation in the subsequent period. A job change or a reduction of workload on
a given job thus yields no short-term beneﬁts in terms of delayed retirement.
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A. Appendix: Retirement ages
Normal retirement ages men(women) : Austria 65(60), Belgium 65(64), Den-
mark 65(65), France 60(60), Germany 65(65), Greece 65(60), Italy 65(60),
the Netherlands 65(65), Spain 65(65), Sweden 65(65), and Switzerland
65(64).
B. Appendix: Detailed estimation results
Table 8: Total sample – OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPM-1 LPM-2 LPM-3 LPM-4 Probit (margeﬀ)
Heavy job demands 0.022∗ 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
1940 0.552∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.039)
1941 0.558∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.041)
1942 0.219∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.051)
1943 0.074∗ 0.074∗ 0.078∗ 0.082∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.050)
1944 0.034 0.033 0.038 0.008 0.030
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.046)
1945 0.074∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.080∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.043)
381947 −0.095∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
1948 −0.147∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
1949 −0.137∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
1950 −0.197∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022)
1951 −0.209∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.021)
1952 −0.243∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.019)
1953 −0.255∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018)
1954 −0.233∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.020)
Austria 0.200∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.047)
Germany 0.081∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032)
Netherlands 0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.029)
Spain 0.086∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.043
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030)
Italy 0.182∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.037)
France 0.115∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) (0.029)
Denmark 0.067∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025)
Greece 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.024 −0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.025)
Switzerland −0.002 −0.010 −0.011 0.003 −0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
Belgium 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030)
Female 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
No formal education −0.041 −0.046 −0.043 −0.044
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.044)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.021∗ 0.019 0.031∗∗ 0.034∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Tertiary education −0.034∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.021 −0.027∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)




39Electricity, gas, water 0.118∗ 0.131∗ 0.120∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.073)
Construction −0.033 −0.003 0.002
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027)
Wholesale and retail −0.054∗∗ −0.049∗ −0.055∗∗
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
Hotels and restaurants −0.094∗∗ −0.050 −0.052
(0.037) (0.046) (0.041)
Transport, storage, communication −0.003 0.007 0.016
(0.027) (0.030) (0.029)
Financial intermediation 0.097∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Real estate, renting, business activities −0.015 −0.015 −0.013
(0.024) (0.027) (0.026)
Public administration and defense −0.025 −0.032 −0.028
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Education −0.017 −0.028 −0.029
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Health and social work −0.038∗ −0.036 −0.034
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Other community, social and personal services −0.055∗∗ −0.035 −0.035
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028)
Other −0.060∗∗ −0.039 −0.050
(0.031) (0.042) (0.043)
Missing −0.022 −0.010 −0.004
(0.024) (0.028) (0.030)
Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers 0.014 0.015 0.006
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Technicians and associate professionals 0.008 −0.003 −0.009
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
Clerks 0.007 −0.007 −0.011
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Services and sales workers −0.000 −0.009 −0.016
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.054 0.051 0.038
(0.037) (0.044) (0.047)
Craft and related workers 0.044∗ 0.005 0.001
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.023 −0.014 −0.014
(0.028) (0.032) (0.028)
Elementary occupations 0.026 −0.009 −0.017
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026)
Other 0.109∗∗ 0.074 0.067
(0.048) (0.054) (0.052)
Missing −0.015 −0.022 −0.014
(0.034) (0.047) (0.051)
Private pension 0.015 0.008
(0.016) (0.015)
40Early ret. possibility 0.013 0.010
(0.013) (0.013)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree −0.059∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020)
Self employed −0.039∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.018) (0.016)
Excellent h. −0.027∗ −0.026∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Very good h. −0.028∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Fair h. 0.040∗ 0.039∗
(0.023) (0.021)
Poor h. 0.049 0.054
(0.056) (0.053)
Constant 0.182∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.032) (0.046)
Observations 4836 4836 4836 3832 3816
R2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: ≤ 58 – OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPM-1 LPM-2 LPM-3 LPM-4 Probit (margeﬀ)
Heavy job demands 0.007 0.001 −0.001 −0.010 −0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
1947 −0.095∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031)
1948 −0.144∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
1949 −0.134∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.026)
1950 −0.196∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022)
1951 −0.210∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.021)
1952 −0.241∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.021)
1953 −0.253∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021)
1954 −0.232∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.228∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.021)
Austria 0.161∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.053)
Germany 0.033∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.036 0.045
41(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033)
Netherlands 0.092∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032)
Spain 0.054∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.036 0.015 0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029)
Italy 0.187∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.043)
France 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.029)
Denmark 0.005 0.014 0.008 0.016 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021)
Greece 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.011 −0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023)
Switzerland 0.013 0.003 0.005 0.009 0.005
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Belgium 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.033)
Female 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
No formal education −0.027 −0.037 −0.038 −0.035
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.037)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.028∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Tertiary education −0.036∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.026∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)




Electricity, gas, water 0.074 0.118 0.106
(0.070) (0.079) (0.076)
Construction −0.022 0.009 0.013
(0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
Wholesale and retail −0.028 −0.040∗ −0.042∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Hotels and restaurants −0.051 −0.031 −0.024
(0.034) (0.044) (0.040)
Transport, storage, communication 0.014 0.024 0.031
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030)
Financial intermediation 0.059 0.050 0.050
(0.037) (0.040) (0.039)
Real estate, renting, business activities −0.011 −0.016 −0.012
(0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
Public administration and defense −0.019 −0.025 −0.021
(0.022) (0.024) (0.020)
Education −0.032 −0.035 −0.033
(0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Health and social work −0.030 −0.020 −0.015
42(0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Other community, social and personal services −0.041∗ −0.025 −0.025
(0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
Other −0.064∗∗ −0.050 −0.051
(0.027) (0.039) (0.034)
Missing −0.015 −0.010 −0.006
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029)
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers −0.018 −0.022 −0.029
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019)
(3) Technicians and associate professionals −0.011 −0.020 −0.026
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
(4) Clerks −0.006 −0.014 −0.017
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020)
(5) Services and sales workers −0.026 −0.032 −0.033
(0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
(6) Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.033 0.021 0.002
(0.040) (0.046) (0.043)
(7) Craft and related workers 0.039 −0.004 −0.011
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.018 −0.025 −0.024
(0.028) (0.032) (0.025)
(9) Elementary occupations 0.007 −0.017 −0.024
(0.024) (0.028) (0.023)
Other 0.064 0.033 0.028
(0.050) (0.055) (0.049)
Missing −0.003 0.006 0.008
(0.033) (0.046) (0.049)
Private pension 0.000 −0.004
(0.016) (0.013)
Early ret. possibility 0.005 0.002
(0.013) (0.012)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree −0.057∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.018)
Self employed 0.005 0.010
(0.018) (0.018)
Excellent h. −0.015 −0.011
(0.015) (0.015)
Very good h. −0.027∗∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.013) (0.012)
Fair h. 0.045∗ 0.040∗
(0.024) (0.021)
Poor h. 0.031 0.040
(0.057) (0.055)
Constant 0.206∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.046)
Observations 3891 3891 3891 3049 3033
R2 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12
43Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: > 58 – OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LPM-1 LPM-2 LPM-3 LPM-4 Probit (margeﬀ)
Heavy job demands 0.093∗∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.046) (0.042)
1940 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.044 0.040
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.067) (0.042)
1942 −0.328∗∗∗−0.330∗∗∗−0.333∗∗∗−0.310∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.074)
1943 −0.464∗∗∗−0.463∗∗∗−0.467∗∗∗−0.474∗∗∗ −0.429∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.063) (0.076)
1944 −0.531∗∗∗−0.531∗∗∗−0.532∗∗∗−0.571∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.069)
1945 −0.491∗∗∗−0.492∗∗∗−0.488∗∗∗−0.511∗∗∗ −0.476∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059) (0.073)
Austria 0.403∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.115) (0.107) (0.115) (0.055)
Germany 0.206∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.053) (0.055) (0.073) (0.056)
Netherlands 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.067) (0.053)
Spain 0.150∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.059) (0.061) (0.063) (0.088) (0.075)
Italy 0.025 0.024 0.037 0.139 0.151
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.094) (0.092)
France 0.292∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.115) (0.121) (0.132) (0.083)
Denmark 0.233∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.064) (0.055)
Greece −0.148∗∗∗−0.150∗∗∗−0.077 0.060 0.035
(0.052) (0.052) (0.059) (0.093) (0.092)
Switzerland −0.048 −0.051 −0.059 0.015 0.010
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.060)
Belgium 0.143∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.083) (0.072)
Female 0.018 0.018 0.035 0.033 0.030
(0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
No formal education −0.084 −0.081 0.031 0.034
(0.141) (0.149) (0.197) (0.190)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.015 0.019 0.031 0.032
(0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040)
Tertiary education −0.021 −0.032 −0.012 −0.005
44(0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044)




Electricity, gas, water 0.206 0.099 0.080
(0.132) (0.123) (0.172)
Construction −0.070 −0.063 −0.065
(0.069) (0.072) (0.068)
Wholesale and retail −0.167∗∗ −0.131∗ −0.136∗
(0.069) (0.078) (0.072)
Hotels and restaurants −0.300∗∗ −0.141 −0.129
(0.151) (0.183) (0.126)
Transport, storage, communication −0.110 −0.089 −0.079
(0.077) (0.086) (0.085)
Financial intermediation 0.279∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.118) (0.078)
Real estate, renting, business activities −0.040 −0.042 −0.044
(0.082) (0.085) (0.077)
Public administration and defense −0.052 −0.088 −0.081
(0.067) (0.071) (0.067)
Education 0.045 −0.026 −0.025
(0.069) (0.070) (0.069)
Health and social work −0.051 −0.104 −0.098
(0.064) (0.067) (0.067)
Other community, social and personal services −0.072 −0.052 −0.036
(0.075) (0.082) (0.078)
Other −0.091 −0.033 −0.004
(0.144) (0.185) (0.130)
Missing −0.041 0.028 0.027
(0.070) (0.081) (0.081)
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers 0.125∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
(3) Technicians and associate professionals 0.064 0.038 0.041
(0.049) (0.051) (0.054)
(4) Clerks 0.049 −0.003 −0.004
(0.064) (0.068) (0.070)
(5) Services and sales workers 0.079 0.076 0.074
(0.061) (0.063) (0.066)
(6) Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.119 0.104 0.106
(0.093) (0.107) (0.102)
(7) Craft and related workers 0.037 0.013 0.009
(0.072) (0.075) (0.077)
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.050 0.003 0.003
(0.085) (0.092) (0.085)
(9) Elementary occupations 0.053 −0.040 −0.041
(0.069) (0.079) (0.077)




Private pension 0.081∗ 0.077∗
(0.048) (0.044)
Early ret. possibility 0.053 0.051
(0.039) (0.040)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree −0.082 −0.094
(0.088) (0.072)
Self employed −0.194∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.046)
Excellent h. −0.046 −0.044
(0.044) (0.045)
Very good h. 0.002 0.004
(0.039) (0.038)
Fair h. 0.029 0.026
(0.064) (0.056)
Poor h. 0.203 0.162
(0.142) (0.117)
Constant 0.687∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.080) (0.129)
Observations 945 945 945 783 774
R2 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.30
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Total – Long & IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM-5 LPM-6 2SLS-1 2SLS-2
Heavy job demands 1.0000 −0.001 0.001 0.040 −0.091
(0.018) (0.021) (0.138) (0.172)
Heavy job demands (main) 0.033∗ 0.029 0.019 0.051
(0.019) (0.021) (0.044) (0.055)
1940 0.561∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
1941 0.531∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.065) (0.058) (0.065)
1942 0.170∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.063) (0.058) (0.063)
1943 0.045 0.043 0.055 0.053
(0.051) (0.057) (0.052) (0.058)
1944 0.022 −0.011 0.030 0.009
(0.048) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054)
1945 0.045 0.038 0.051 0.044
(0.048) (0.052) (0.048) (0.052)
461947 −0.108∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045)
1948 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045)
1949 −0.154∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044)
1950 −0.221∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040)
1951 −0.221∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
1952 −0.290∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)
1953 −0.290∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.039)
1954 −0.263∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039)
Austria 0.227∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.057) (0.049) (0.056)
Germany 0.099∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
Netherlands 0.201∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.038)
Spain 0.078∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.071
(0.035) (0.044) (0.036) (0.047)
Italy 0.189∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.041)
France 0.150∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035)
Denmark 0.110∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035)
Greece 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.016
(0.026) (0.038) (0.027) (0.038)
Switzerland −0.001 0.025 0.003 0.032
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
Belgium 0.138∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.034)
Female 0.024 0.016 0.024 0.014
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
No formal education −0.079 −0.106∗ −0.073 −0.107∗
(0.053) (0.061) (0.057) (0.062)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.024 0.047∗∗ 0.024 0.044∗
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Tertiary education −0.016 −0.008 −0.021 −0.005
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Agriculture and ﬁshing 0.043 0.060 0.040 0.092
(0.075) (0.081) (0.079) (0.088)
Mining −0.206∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.046)
47Electricity, gas, water 0.128 0.118 0.138 0.117
(0.088) (0.098) (0.085) (0.098)
Construction −0.043 −0.007 −0.025 0.007
(0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041)
Wholesale and retail −0.082∗∗ −0.060 −0.080∗∗∗ −0.061∗
(0.034) (0.041) (0.029) (0.036)
Hotels and restaurants −0.109∗ −0.029 −0.126∗ −0.034
(0.062) (0.072) (0.065) (0.071)
Transport, storage, communication 0.001 0.006 −0.001 0.002
(0.038) (0.043) (0.034) (0.040)
Financial intermediation 0.094∗ 0.089∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.085∗
(0.050) (0.053) (0.048) (0.051)
Real estate, renting, business activities −0.023 −0.026 −0.024 −0.035
(0.036) (0.041) (0.032) (0.037)
Public administration and defense −0.014 −0.019 −0.011 −0.022
(0.032) (0.035) (0.029) (0.031)
Education −0.015 −0.030 −0.025 −0.038
(0.032) (0.035) (0.027) (0.029)
Health and social work −0.057∗ −0.061∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.062∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.036)
Other community, social and personal services −0.084∗∗ −0.081∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.093∗∗
(0.038) (0.044) (0.036) (0.041)
Other −0.069 −0.029 −0.069∗ −0.049
(0.043) (0.058) (0.040) (0.058)
Missing −0.025 0.005
(0.037) (0.042)
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers 0.026 0.030
(0.026) (0.030)
(3) Technicians and associate professionals 0.015 −0.008
(0.023) (0.025)
(4) Clerks 0.041 0.018
(0.031) (0.035)
(5) Services and sales workers −0.004 −0.036
(0.031) (0.035)
(6) Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.037 0.032
(0.051) (0.058)
(7) Craft and related workers 0.072∗∗ 0.010
(0.036) (0.039)
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.007 −0.040
(0.040) (0.045)






Private pension 0.023 0.024
(0.022) (0.022)
48Early pension 0.002 −0.002
(0.018) (0.020)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree −0.056 −0.073∗
(0.034) (0.041)
Self employed −0.069∗∗∗ −0.048∗
(0.026) (0.028)
Excellent h. −0.031 −0.034
(0.021) (0.021)
Very good h. −0.042∗∗ −0.042∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
Fair h. 0.045 0.044
(0.033) (0.033)
Poor h. 0.125 0.119
(0.078) (0.076)
Constant 0.206∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.068) (0.040) (0.073)
Observations 2708 2151 2640 2116
R2 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: ≤ 58 – Long & IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM-5 LPM-6 2SLS-1 2SLS-2
Heavy job demands −0.020 −0.020 0.092 −0.091
(0.018) (0.021) (0.147) (0.185)
Heavy job demands (main) 0.013 −0.001 −0.019 0.010
(0.019) (0.022) (0.045) (0.054)
1947 −0.109∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045)
1948 −0.152∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045)
1949 −0.152∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044)
1950 −0.223∗∗∗ −0.249∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
1951 −0.223∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041)
1952 −0.291∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.038) (0.035) (0.040)
1953 −0.295∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039)
1954 −0.266∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.039)
Austria 0.197∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
49(0.051) (0.061) (0.050) (0.059)
Germany 0.050∗ 0.043 0.043 0.052
(0.029) (0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
Netherlands 0.139∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040)
Spain 0.057 0.023 0.071∗ 0.015
(0.037) (0.045) (0.038) (0.047)
Italy 0.198∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.045) (0.036) (0.044)
France 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036)
Denmark 0.022 0.025 0.014 0.029
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.034)
Greece 0.027 0.001 0.024 −0.008
(0.026) (0.039) (0.027) (0.038)
Switzerland 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.000
(0.035) (0.039) (0.037) (0.041)
Belgium 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.036) (0.028) (0.036)
Female 0.028∗ 0.023 0.027∗ 0.025
(0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
No formal education −0.071 −0.086 −0.059 −0.069
(0.052) (0.062) (0.060) (0.063)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.030 0.054∗∗ 0.029 0.052∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Tertiary education −0.018 −0.015 −0.025 −0.016
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
Agriculture and ﬁshing 0.020 0.048 0.007 0.087
(0.080) (0.085) (0.084) (0.095)
Mining −0.194∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.047)
Electricity, gas, water 0.024 0.046 0.043 0.048
(0.098) (0.111) (0.092) (0.109)
Construction −0.024 0.005 −0.017 0.025
(0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.047)
Wholesale and retail −0.038 −0.037 −0.047 −0.031
(0.035) (0.040) (0.030) (0.036)
Hotels and restaurants −0.091 −0.085 −0.123∗∗ −0.080
(0.056) (0.071) (0.058) (0.069)
Transport, storage, communication 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.015
(0.041) (0.047) (0.037) (0.043)
Financial intermediation 0.062 0.041 0.066 0.042
(0.052) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052)
Real estate, renting, business activities −0.002 −0.024 −0.009 −0.026
(0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.038)
Public administration and defense −0.003 −0.016 −0.001 −0.014
(0.034) (0.038) (0.032) (0.034)
Education −0.030 −0.043 −0.039 −0.042
50(0.033) (0.037) (0.027) (0.030)
Health and social work −0.044 −0.054 −0.067∗∗ −0.051
(0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.036)
Other community, social and personal services −0.068∗ −0.067 −0.073∗∗ −0.068∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.038)
Other −0.083∗∗ −0.080 −0.083∗∗ −0.092∗
(0.038) (0.052) (0.037) (0.051)
Missing −0.025 −0.012
(0.038) (0.044)
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers 0.007 −0.001
(0.027) (0.031)
(3) Technicians and associate professionals −0.002 −0.019
(0.023) (0.026)
(4) Clerks 0.035 0.019
(0.033) (0.037)
(5) Services and sales workers 0.004 −0.009
(0.033) (0.038)
(6) Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.061 0.030
(0.056) (0.063)
(7) Craft and related workers 0.079∗∗ 0.010
(0.038) (0.042)
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.030 −0.024
(0.040) (0.046)






Private pension 0.008 0.008
(0.023) (0.023)
Early ret. possibility −0.006 −0.009
(0.019) (0.021)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree −0.061∗ −0.072∗
(0.035) (0.043)
Self employed −0.017 −0.006
(0.026) (0.028)
Excellent h. −0.024 −0.027
(0.022) (0.022)
Very good h. −0.035∗ −0.035∗
(0.019) (0.019)
Fair h. 0.050 0.050
(0.035) (0.035)
Poor h. 0.071 0.057
(0.087) (0.086)
Constant 0.230∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.071) (0.042) (0.075)
51Observations 2076 1624 2017 1595
R2 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.15
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 13: > 58 – Long & IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM-5 LPM-6 2SLS-1 2SLS-2
Heavy job demands 0.053 0.052 -0.372 -0.475
(0.050) (0.057) (0.376) (0.511)
Heavy job demands (main) 0.137∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.283∗ 0.359∗
(0.052) (0.062) (0.150) (0.217)
1940 0.548∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.069) (0.075) (0.091)
1941 0.505∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.073) (0.068) (0.073)
1942 0.143∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.160∗∗
(0.062) (0.068) (0.063) (0.068)
1943 0.030 0.023 0.014 0.007
(0.058) (0.063) (0.060) (0.068)
1944 -0.002 -0.036 0.027 0.005
(0.055) (0.058) (0.063) (0.072)
Austria 0.282∗∗ 0.336∗∗ 0.287∗ 0.316∗
(0.134) (0.147) (0.156) (0.168)
Germany 0.213∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.087) (0.074) (0.084)
Netherlands 0.360∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.087) (0.076) (0.093)
Spain 0.103 0.214∗∗ 0.075 0.144
(0.080) (0.105) (0.082) (0.130)
Italy -0.002 0.074 0.035 0.057
(0.089) (0.106) (0.099) (0.110)
France 0.316∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.279∗ 0.263
(0.146) (0.155) (0.144) (0.168)
Denmark 0.287∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.078) (0.078) (0.087)
Greece -0.135∗ -0.030 -0.149∗ -0.031
(0.076) (0.116) (0.086) (0.136)
Switzerland -0.041 0.026 0.025 0.110
(0.065) (0.069) (0.078) (0.090)
Belgium 0.080 0.196∗ 0.076 0.170
(0.078) (0.101) (0.076) (0.107)
Female -0.001 -0.040 -0.028 -0.064
(0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.054)
No formal education 0.000 -0.017 -0.004 -0.004
52(0.200) (0.181) (0.171) (0.171)
Primary or lower secondary education 0.044 0.045 0.064 0.061
(0.048) (0.052) (0.063) (0.067)
Tertiary education 0.018 0.024 0.013 0.053
(0.049) (0.055) (0.049) (0.055)
Agriculture and ﬁshing 0.165 0.145 0.259 0.150
(0.143) (0.174) (0.163) (0.173)
Mining -0.186 -0.471∗∗
(0.166) (0.236)
Electricity, gas, water 0.440∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.103) (0.106) (0.103)
Construction -0.088 -0.037 -0.031 -0.009
(0.084) (0.086) (0.085) (0.098)
Wholesale and retail -0.204∗∗ -0.132 -0.140∗ -0.107
(0.084) (0.097) (0.072) (0.094)
Hotels and restaurants -0.082 0.322 0.107 0.406∗
(0.199) (0.225) (0.209) (0.241)
Transport, storage, communication -0.067 -0.043 -0.051 -0.034
(0.097) (0.105) (0.095) (0.116)
Financial intermediation 0.262∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.141) (0.126) (0.146)
Real estate, renting, business activities -0.152 -0.098 -0.121 -0.124
(0.097) (0.102) (0.095) (0.104)
Public administration and defense -0.077 -0.060 -0.063 -0.056
(0.079) (0.084) (0.072) (0.080)
Education 0.023 -0.007 0.029 -0.024
(0.083) (0.084) (0.071) (0.075)
Health and social work -0.086 -0.064 0.000 0.024
(0.079) (0.084) (0.088) (0.134)
Other community, social and personal services -0.095 -0.064 -0.109 -0.120
(0.093) (0.102) (0.089) (0.096)
Other -0.042 0.127 0.019 0.059
(0.156) (0.193) (0.160) (0.229)
Missing -0.023 0.069
(0.099) (0.114)
(1) Legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers 0.065 0.074
(0.062) (0.067)
(3) Technicians and associate professionals 0.051 0.011
(0.059) (0.061)
(4) Clerks 0.022 -0.004
(0.081) (0.085)
(5) Services and sales workers -0.045 -0.091
(0.076) (0.080)
(6) Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers -0.069 -0.058
(0.128) (0.144)
(7) Craft and related workers -0.017 -0.055
(0.088) (0.094)
(8) Plant and machine operators and assemblers -0.093 -0.111
53(0.113) (0.120)






Private pension 0.078 0.094
(0.058) (0.058)
Early ret. possibility 0.020 0.007
(0.049) (0.059)
Satisﬁed with job - (strongly) agree -0.059 -0.110
(0.102) (0.122)
Self employed -0.189∗∗∗ -0.126
(0.065) (0.078)
Excellent h. -0.017 -0.070
(0.056) (0.075)
Very good h. -0.026 -0.072
(0.046) (0.065)
Fair h. 0.045 0.053
(0.081) (0.088)
Poor h. 0.327∗ 0.411∗∗
(0.167) (0.180)
Constant 0.209∗∗ 0.200 0.228∗∗∗ 0.284
(0.085) (0.146) (0.074) (0.175)
Observations 632 527 623 521
R2 0.29 0.34 0.19 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
54